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Abstract 
This paper is part of a wider research program on Taxation in New EU Members, carried on at the 
University of Pavia, under the direction of L. Bernardi, M. Chandler and L. Gandullia, and the 
supervision of V. Tanzi. After the initial executive summary, the second section discusses the 
recurrent argument according to which New Members’ Government would be still oversized. We find 
that some reduction of spending/revenue levels may be worthwhile and feasible, even without 
dramatically cutting down social programs. The third section considers main issues of total fiscal 
pressure and of equity and efficiency of the whole tax system. Some scaling down of fiscal pressure 
seems feasible and useful. The equity-efficiency trade-off looks very binding. We suggest some 
general and specific interventions to reach an acceptable compromise. The final section critiques the 
structure of the main taxes and the recent changes implemented by New member states. It discusses 
the biases in their taxation of income, their greater efficacy of VAT collection and the frailty of their 
social security systems. 
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1. Executive summary∗ 
 
Main taxes purpose is to finance public spending. Hence it is worthwhile to scrutinize 
(paragraph 2) the size and the scope of government in New Members, before considering their 
tax structure. Speaking of this topic, it has often been argued that governments in some 
transition economies, as the New Members, are too big relative to their tax capacity and the 
need not to interfere with economic development. Public expenditure/GDP ratio is at present 
not far from 42 per cent in the New Members’ average. This figure is just a little below what 
is observed for far higher income countries and well over the level reached by other transition 
economies at the same level of per capita income.  
However one must notice the lack of robustness which characterizes all empirically 
estimated relationships between tax or spending /GDP ratio and per capita incomes. Usually a 
statistically significant fit does exist but countries’ scatter plot is much dispersed. The 
correlation looks still weaker inside the worldwide sub-sample of transition economies. Hence 
-not surprisingly at all- other variables contribute to explaining a higher/lower than “normal” 
level of public spending. Actually many factors, economic, political and social in nature, 
seem at work to pull up spending in the New Members.  
By better focusing our attention on the problem, we observe however that in transition 
economies as well large spreads in public spending are almost entirely due to public sector’s 
engagement in the provision of welfare treatments and services. Once more the particular 
situation of New Members should call for a relevant public intervention in the welfare area. 
However in some New Members there has been a move towards partially funded private 
pension schemes and itemized social insurance funds targeted to single risks. Time will tell 
what has been the best chosen way.  
After the first years of transition to market economy and excluding the period around the 
Russian crisis of 1997, New Members’ rates of growth have generally been enough 
satisfactory and apparently they were not curbed by too cumbersome governments. 
Notwithstanding their bigger governments, New Members outperformed both CIS and Latin 
America countries while only the catching up Asian tigers did better. However both statistical 
evidence and economic theory suggest that there exists a negative even though weak link 
between the level of taxes and public spending on one side and growth rates on the other. 
Therefore, non minimal and well-targeted tax cuts could contribute to further enhancing 
growth, which indeed would help to reduce the current painfully high unemployment. Some 
                                                 
∗ The authors thank R. Puglisi for careful reading and suggestions in a number of areas. 
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scale down of public expenditure is hence called for. Detailed analyses on the issue mainly 
suggested the need to redirect and better target social programs, to make a more efficient use 
of resources in education, health and public administration and finally to strengthen budgetary 
procedures. 
According to authoritative opinions, also total fiscal pressure is too high in the average of 
New Members and should not exceed about thirty per cent, a level more consistent with their 
tax capacity and more supply friendly, but which stays around eight point under the last years 
figure. Furthermore the tax mix should be changed. Direct taxes look comparatively low with 
respect to indirect taxes. Social contributions remain very high. At a first check, we find that 
total fiscal pressure may go down, also if by some point less than the just quoted normative 
prescription. This is the case if one wants to avoid the disruption of public contributions to 
welfare treatments and services. By adding up some increase in direct taxes to the scaling 
down of total expenditures and taxes, a basket of (tentative) about six-to-seven GDP points 
might be allocated to the higher priority tax cuts. Where are they to be allocated it is not a 
question immediate to answer. 
According to the structure of taxation by economic function and to implicit rates the 
trade-off between efficiency and equity in taxation not just arises but appears particularly 
binding. From the point of view of efficiency, New Members’ tax structure overburdens labor 
and hits in a very different degree the various (productive and rent) components of capital and 
business (i.e. national accounting operating surplus). From the point of view of equity, 
consumption taxes stay high, are traditionally considered as regressive and may be 
particularly painful in New Members, because of the -low- level and the -uneven- distribution 
of personal incomes. 
In these circumstances, it is quite difficult to strike a welfare maximizing balance 
between efficiency and equity. A somewhat formal solution would be to equally divide the 
resources’ basket between efficiency -lighter tax wedge on employed labor, via social 
contributions’ cut- and equity -income tax’ enlargement and consumption taxes’ squeezing. 
This chapter also examines separately the four main categories of taxation in the New EU 
member States. The first of these is the personal income tax. Although some countries have 
clearly attempted to implement a uniform taxation of income, they remain in the minority. We 
discuss several explanations for the non-uniform taxation of income in these former command 
economies. The special interest explanation may explain why taxation of income from profits 
is lower than taxation of income from labor when social security payments are accounted for. 
Another plausible explanation is the attempt to minimize tax evasion and take account of the 
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limited capacity of tax authorities in these countries. Making income tax more progressive is a 
debated issue, and the solutions adopted by single New Members vary considerably, on 
economic, social and political grounds. Progressivity is very low in some of the States and 
this appears to be determined by a combination of factors including neighbors, expectations of 
taxpayers, and the ability of high earners to cooperate effectively to pursue their interest 
against progressivity. An alternative is to widen the base via the inclusion of incomes that at 
present are generally exempt or just slightly taxed and -even more- through the recovery of 
tax evasion, particularly from the wide sea of the hidden economy. 
The taxation of corporate income has also been imaginative in the New member States. 
Estonia has abolished it in 2000 and others have reduced the rates substantially. Estonia’s 
radical action does not appear to have been a major constraint on the collection of the 
personal income tax. However, reductions in the corporate income tax are only weakly 
correlated with the capacity of entrepreneurs to speed the economic catch up of New member 
States with the rest of the EU. Poland, for example, offers the least freedom for businesses 
among New member States and yet has the most lenient taxation of profit relative to labor 
income. Dynamic efficiency requires that mild taxation of corporations should be maintained, 
to favor the enlargement of entrepreneurship and to attract FDI also after the privatization 
decade. However corporation (or at least dividends) tax should not vanish, especially to 
impede the diffusion of avoidance activities. 
The -painfully increasing- harmonization of excises to EU standards is mandatory, just 
lightened by a long transition period. VAT structure hence becomes the only degree of 
freedom to relieve consumption taxation. Exemptions and reduced (perhaps in few cases also 
negative) rates should therefore be well targeted also according to the empirical evidence of 
Engel’s curves. Still more, as to equity, we have already noticed that New Members have to 
redirect their social programs. All in all, the more equity improving should be welfare 
programs that are effective in relieving the living conditions of the poor. From this point of 
view, implanting a social safety net is the main step to do.  
By comparing the efficacy of the VAT with that of the personal income tax in the region 
we find the tax base of VAT is at least 80 per cent larger than that of personal income in these 
countries. This implies that replacement of personal income taxation with VAT on the margin 
may yield unusually large efficiency gains. We also compare the efficacy of VAT collection 
across the region, and find that the Visegrad region performs less well than the Baltics. We 
should be careful with such comparisons, however, since it is likely that the Baltic states 
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suffer from relatively large under-recording of GDP, and this would bias their recorded VAT 
efficacy upwards. 
Radical changes to the social security system in several New EU member States have left 
their populations somewhat more at risk from instability in the financial markets for their 
pensions. This may be understandable given the instability of collective institutions over the 
longer term in this region, and the resulting low trust in them among the population. However, 
it is interesting to observe that the nations that would be commonly held to be the most 
capitalism savvy, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, have retained the collective pooling of 
risk common in the rest of the EU. 
 
 
 
2. The size and scope of Government 
 
It has often been argued that government in some transition economies, as the New Members, 
is too big relative to their tax capacity and the need not to interfere with economic 
development. A clear updated version of this argument, particularly useful for our purposes, 
has recently been presented by Mitra and Stern (2003) (see also Begg and Wyplosz 1999). 
The Authors observe that, after the shift to market economy, the share of public expenditures 
in CSB (Central, Southeastern Europe and Baltic states, including all the New Members) 
countries has decreased but just of about five points of GDP, from about 47 per cent in 1992 
to near 42 per cent in 2000. This share is about five points higher than the correspondent 
value on the trend line which fits a set of public expenditure/GDP ratios against 
corresponding per capita incomes for a sample of near 50 developed and developing countries 
in the year 2000. Furthermore the level of public expenditure in CSB countries is just 0.5 
points under the value observed for high-income OECD countries, while it is about 13 points 
higher than the correspondent value of CIS (Commonwealth of Independent – post U.S.S.R. – 
states), which decreased by almost 20 points from 1992 to 20001. A broad discussion of the 
previous argument can be synthesized around the following three main issues. 
 
 
2. 1 Public Expenditure/GDP ratio and per capita income 
 
                                                 
1 The PPP per capita income is evaluated at about $ 9,350 for CSB countries, $ 3,850 for CIS countries, and $ 
26,200 for high-income OECD countries. A wider picture about the decline of government size in transition 
economies may be found in Gupta, Leruth, de Mello and Chakravarti (2001). 
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The econometric performance of Mitra and Stern’s (and also of other Authors) relationship 
between public expenditure/GDP ratios and per capita incomes does not look very robust: the 
resulting R2 is not higher than 0.32. Highest-income countries show an expenditure/GDP ratio 
variable within a range from 25 to 55 per cent, lowest-income countries within a range from 
15 to 50 per cent.  
We may briefly go further on the topic. Table 1 shows a more definite albeit small 
sample of transition economies pertaining to main world areas. Tax (= more or less spending) 
/GDP ratios may be contrasted to per capita GDP. High values of taxes to GDP ratios are 
reported for all New Members, where the per capita incomes stay almost always at middle 
values3 usually reported for transition economies and not far from their own average. At 
broadly comparable levels of per capita income, Latin America countries show very large 
differences across countries in the tax/GDP ratio. In any case the specific ratios stay well 
below New Members’ values. CIS countries tax/GDP ratios are widely dispersed too. There is 
no discernible and statistically significant correlation with per capita incomes, which stay well 
below both those of New Members and of Latin American countries. Low per capita incomes 
are showed also by East Asian countries, with the exception of Malaysia and in this area 
tax/GDP ratios are generally quite low. 
Therefore, the multi facet explanatory factors (Burgess and Stern 1993; Gupta, Leruth, de 
Mello and Chakravarti 2001) of the size and scope of government go well beyond the per 
capita income relationship suggested by the Wagner’s law (Wagner 1883), as it has been 
recognized for a long time by the most authoritative literature (Musgrave 1969). Given this 
conclusion we have then to notice that broadly speaking many factors might keep up the level 
of expenditure in New Members: the level of literacy, the relatively small size of the 
agricultural sector, the degree of urbanization, an ageing population, the long-term legacy of 
communist social aims on voters’ preferences and lobbies’ activities, weak budgetary  
 
                                                 
2 Burgess and Stern (1993) show a similar estimated relationship for the ratio of taxes to GDP. Here also total 
explained variability is quite low (R2 = 0.03); constant term value is high; the coefficient associated to (log of) 
pro-capita income is higher than one and statistically significant at five per cent. However this means that 
countries’ scatter plot is very dispersed, that public goods are superior goods, but the percentage average (not 
marginal) increase of expenditures or taxes/GDP ratio is less than for per-capita income, within any observed 
range. Also Gupta, Leruth, de Mello and Chakravarty (2001) give about the same results, for 148 countries, 
considering the period 1970-98. 
3 The exception is Slovenia, whose per capita income reaches a value (> 6,000 US $ per year) commonly 
ascribed to high-income countries. 
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Tab. 1 Government revenue/GDP percentage ratios, per capita incomes and rates of growth - Selected transition economies - Year 2000  
                  
NEW MEMBERS  Rev. /GDP  Per cap. GDP Growth   CIS Rev. /GDP  Per cap. GDP Growth 
         
Czech Republic 41.1 4,940 2.9  Belarus 44.3 860 5.8 
Estonia 38.7 3,510 6.4  Kazhakstan 19.6 1,230 1.7 
Hungary 44.0 4,550 3.8  Russia 37.0 1,730 3.5 
Poland 40.4 4,100 4.1  Turkmenistan 23.4 850 1.8 
Slovenia 43.3 9,160 4.8  Ukraine 34.2 640 6.0 
         
LATIN AMERICA Rev. /GDP  Per cap. GDP Growth   EAST ASIA Rev. /GDP  Per cap. GDP Growth 
         
Brazil 32.9 4,310 0.8  China 16.5 780 8.0 
Chile 19.3 4,630 5.4  Philippines 12.7 1,050 4.0 
Colombia 16.2 2,290 2.8  India 15.6 440 7.2 
Mexico 12.1 4,790 6.9  Malaysia 20.1 3,390 8.3 
Venezuela 8.5 3,150 3,2  Thailand 14,2 2,010 4,4 
                  
         
Sources: New Members and Cis countries, Mitra and Stern (2003); Latin America: Martner and Tromben (2003); East Asia and growth rates: U. N. Statistical  
               Yearbook, 2002.         
Notes: Per capita GDP values are in US $ at 2000 exchange rates and not PPP corrected. Some data refer to 1999.   
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institutions and so forth. 
More specifically however, the supposed over-sizing of New Members’ governments is 
almost entirely due to the level of social security and welfare expenditures. According to 
Mitra and Stern’s data, in New Members these programs together account for the 14.0 per 
cent of GDP, against 15.6 per cent observed in high-income countries, and just the 7.8 percent 
of CIS countries. Here the welfare programs have been seriously cut in the post-communist 
era, particularly in Asian states. The remaining functional structure of public expenditure does 
not differ too much among country groups (including Education and Health, this latter with 
the exception of CIS countries, which cut it down to 2.2 per cent of GDP as to 2002). It is 
then the (public) provision of welfare services which makes the difference among the 
observed levels of public expenditure also in transition economies. This is not an uncommon 
feature when one looks at a wider set of countries at various stages of development (Burgess 
and Stern 1993), including those with a high pro capita income (Richards et all. 1994). 
Political economy views may give a first explanation of the survival of wide welfare 
programs in East European transition economies (Milanovic 1999). It is commonly reported 
(Tanzi 1993 for all) that almost in any country an increase in poverty and a more unequal 
distribution of incomes went with transition process. As a consequence most social indicators 
went down and this stimulated electoral support for income maintenance programs also 
intended to avoid the disruption of social cohesion.  
Furthermore, population ageing shared by almost all New Members pushes social 
security and health care expenditures further up. Other factors seem to suggest the difficulty 
of scaling down education, health care and social protection programs in New Members 
(Heller and Keller 2001), as it has been accomplished in other countries (Tanzi and 
Schuknecht 1997). A large share of population is unemployed and/or poor and anyway 
requires public intervention against income and disability risk as well not to be excluded from 
proper level of health care and education. New programs are required to meet the specific 
social risks of market economies (Kopitis 1993). However it should be noticed that many 
albeit not all New Members are moving toward “three pillars” pension schemes and itemized 
public insurance funds to cover other social risks. Pros and cons of this move are discussed at 
length afterward in the chapter (par. 4.4). 
A final remark is however necessary. Any suggestion to preserve wide cope and aims of 
social programs and public services might be challenged, by alleging the high level of 
corruption which characterizes public sector in most transition economies, the post-
communist ones’ especially. Generally speaking, the answer to this must not necessarily be 
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found in scaling down public activities to the level of the “minimal state” (Burgess and Stern 
1993). More precisely, it has been argued that corruption can be fought by speeding up 
structural reforms. Still, we must point out that almost all of our selected New Members stay 
at the top of the structural reforms index in transition economies, as well as at the bottom of 
the corruption ranking (Abed and Davoodi 2000)4. 
 
 
2. 2 Size of Government and economic performance 
 
After the first years of transition to market economy and excluding the period around the 
Russian crisis of 1997, New Members’ rates of growth have generally been satisfactory and 
apparently they were not curbed by too cumbersome governments. As it is shown in Table 1, 
at present Czech Republic runs at three per cent of increase of GDP yearly; Estonia and the 
other Baltic states perform far better at more than five per cent yearly; Hungary stays around 
four per cent as substantially also Poland and Slovenia do.  
Transition economies of CIS countries as well as those of Latin America do not perform 
generally better and a clear cut relationship with taxes to GDP ratios looks very difficult to be 
found. “Asian tigers” outperform all other transition economies’ growth: here, as it has just 
been seen, the size of Government is generally small (20-25 per cent of GDP). A necessary 
caveat to be raised here is that the direction of causality in this relationship is quite uncertain, 
especially for transition economies. Furthermore in Asian countries the level of income per 
capita is still low, thus reducing somewhat the demand for public goods. Economies are still 
passing through the catching-up stage. Households’ cohesion of the peasant society does 
survive. On the contrary inside more urbanized societies as the New Members, the supply of 
public goods and the provision of welfare services might give a contribution not just to equity, 
but also to efficiency (Atkinson 1999). 
More broadly speaking, cross countries correlation analyses (Agell et all. 1997)5 as well 
as a diversified but converging stream of theoretical literature (Bernardi 2003)6 came to the 
conclusion that there is a weak negative link between the level of taxes and public spending 
                                                 
4 The average value of structural reform index for New Members is about 50 per cent over the corresponding 
average of the other post communist European and ex- U.S.S.R. states. Corruption ranking performs more than 
twice better in the average with respect to the same sample of other countries, the only worse exception being 
Latvia and Lithuania (in fact ex-U.S.S.R. republics), but not Estonia. 
5 A large number of such analyses were performed during last thirty years. The emerging relationship between 
the level of taxes & public spending and GDP’s rate of growth all in all was found weak and unstable. It turned 
out that crucial control variables are the stage of single countries’ development (if in the catching up phase or 
not) and the share of old people on total population. 
6 This holds true for labor market models, and for both exogenous and endogenous growth models. 
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on one side and growth rates on the other. Therefore, only huge and well-targeted tax cuts can 
contribute to sustaining economic growth. Then, some cuts in public spending, together with a 
shift in tax bases should take place, for a total not minimal amount. We come back to this 
issue in the following paragraphs.  
 
 
2.3 More efficient and lower spending 
 
New Members can be included in the group of transition economies that seem to do better in 
raising tax revenue as well as in spending it (Gupta, Leruth, de Mello and Chakravarti 2001), 
on the basis of selected indicators of governments’ tax burden and spending benefits. This 
does not imply that some social programs need not to be revised, in order to perform better, to 
be less costly, and to become more appropriate with respect to the targets. There are three 
main strategies that could be jointly pursued, in order to decrease by some points the 
spending/GDP ratio, so to make possible an equivalent cut down of taxes (see paragraph. 2.4).  
 
i) Redirecting social protection – The process (Kopitis 1993) of adapting social security 
programs to the needs and constraints of a market economy must be still accomplished. Public 
pension and income maintenance plans should be better tailored to the emerging demographic 
decline7 and to the persisting high level of poverty and inequality. Unemployment benefits 
should be targeted to the recovery of a work position and not only to a passive income 
support. A universal means tested social security safety net is still lacking almost everywhere. 
 
ii) More efficient resources’ use in education and health – It has been convincingly reported 
that resources are not efficiently employed both in education and in health services (Gupta, 
Leruth, de Mello and Chakravarti 2001). Education is too concentrated in pre- and initial 
levels as well as in the top ones. Intermediate levels are suffering, especially by considering 
the fact that they must supply the new human capacities required by fastening growth and the 
modernizing of both private and public services. Health requires a re-balancing between 
preventive and curative activities, a reduction of hospital beds and times of hospitalization. 
Both services look overstaffed.  
 
iii) Public Administration, civil service and budgetary procedures – As it is reported in other 
parts of this research, present working of Public Administration looks generally poor and 
                                                 
7 See par. 4.4 below for a discussion concerning the alternative of public PAYIG or partially private funding 
pension schemes. 
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inefficient. Regulatory activities remain cumbersome. Corruption has been cut down, but not 
eliminated. Public employment must still be downsized to the more limited dimensions 
required by the aims of Government in a market economy. Public pay is in turn comparatively 
high. However improving all these aspects is not an easy task. Well established vested 
interests and powerful lobby groups may resist any reform. They will be more easily subdued 
when hopefully stronger budgetary procedures will progressively enter in force, both at the 
central and local levels of government. 
 
 
 
3. Taxation structure and main effects 
 
 
3.1 Taxation level and structure 
 
Mitra and Stern (2003) have also outlined something like an “optimal” tax level and structure 
which would not damage efficiency and growth (see also Buiter 1997). Total fiscal pressure 
and tax mix are basically set according to the level of per capita income: here we consider 
suitable figures for the average of New Members. Income tax basis accounts for about half of 
GDP, which is a small figure, mainly due to the difficulties to tax widespread small informal 
business. Given a (not low) average net rate of 20 per cent, the yield could stay around eight 
per cent of GDP. International competition would suggest in turn not to raise corporation tax 
over two-to-three points of GDP.  
VAT should be limited to about seven per cent of GDP: it would be difficult to enlarge 
its basis, when both the tax and the administration are new; too high rates might be 
distortionary. Excises duties may total an average of 2.5 per cent of GDP: this burden is 
already heavy by considering that they are levied on a tax basis which amounts to about five 
percent of GDP. Social contributions should not stay over a level of around 11 per cent of 
GDP, un order not to exert a disincentive effect on labor supply and not to promote the 
shadow economy. To sum up, according to Mitra and Stern’s view, total fiscal pressure 
should not exceed about thirty per cent as average of New Members, i.e. around eight point 
under the last years figure. Mitra and Stern go on by observing that Eastern European tax-mix 
looks more similar to developing than to developed countries’ model and is imbalanced both 
on efficiency as well as on equity grounds. Direct taxes look comparatively low with respect 
to indirect taxes. Social contributions remain very high. Their present level would be a legacy  
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 Tab. 2 Taxes/GDP percentage ratios: selected New Members and EU 15 (late 1990s) and ‘optimal values’   
                      
   Czech Estonia Hungary Poland  Slovenia Unweighted ‘Optimal EU 15  
     Republic         average Values’    
            
 Direct Taxes, of which 9.0 11.1 8.7 11.2 7.8 9.6 10.5 13.7  
 Income tax  5.2 8.5 6.5 8.3 6.6 7.0 8.0 9.3  
 Corporation tax 3.7 2.6 2.2 2.9 1.2 2.5 2.5 3.0  
            
 Indirect taxes, of which 12.4 14.3 16.3 14.4 18.9 15.3 9.5 13.9  
 Value added tax 6.6 8.8 7.9 7.9 9.1 8.1 7.0 7.0  
 Excises duties 3.7 3.8 4.2 3.9 4.4 4.0 2.5 3.5  
            
 TOTAL TAXES 21.4 25.4 25.0 25.6 26.7 24.8 20.0 27.6  
            
 Social contributions 16.9 12.1 13.9 12.2 13.8 13.8 11.0 15.0  
            
 TOTAL FISCAL REVENUE 38.3 37.5 38.9 37.8 40.5 38.6 31.0 42.6  
                      
            
 Sources: EU Commission (2000) for New Members and Eurostat (2000) for EU. Mitra and Stern (2003) for ‘optimal values’ (see text). 
 Notes: Data fom New Members differ from those in Tab. 1, because of the change in source and reference year.   
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both of the communist era and of the need to preserve social cohesion during the first years of 
transition, by means of largely diffused social transfers. Therefore the Authors’ suggestion is 
to update the tax mix, through a rise in the share of direct taxes, particularly personal ones’, 
balanced by a reduction of domestic indirect taxes8 and social contributions. 
We may try a first check of Mitra and Stern’s suggestions, by looking at the data on 
Table 2. Some room to increase income tax should be possible to find, especially by enlarging 
its basis (see par. 3.3 below). Corporations should not be taxed more heavily and possibly 
less, especially to attract FDI. On the contrary, some burden could be imposed on capital 
incomes and gains as well as on immovable wealth, which at present are widely exempt or 
very little hit.  
In the average of New Members VAT level doesn’t differ much from the “optimal” 
value. Excises duties will trend upwards as a consequence of a progressive harmonization to 
EU’s levels. Other indirect taxes (not considered by Mitra and Stern) should rather be 
somewhat reduced, especially the (low) remaining custom duties, but will continue to give 
some GDP points of yield (non-consumption and stamp taxes). Therefore as a tendency and 
on the whole indirect taxes seem to be destined to remain around their present level. Some cut 
should be required to lighten their worsening inequality level.  
Social contributions stay some points over the “optimal value” and are still higher than 
the level suitable to deter underground economy and to relieve unemployment, by reducing 
the tax wedge on labor (Tanzi 1993b).  
To conclude, the aforementioned expenditure cuts (see par. 2.3) should allow reducing 
by some point’s total fiscal pressure even if the target suggested by Mitra and Stern seems 
difficult to reach, without disrupting the previously discussed public support to welfare 
programs and services. By adding up some feasible enlargement of direct taxes the bundle for 
tax cuts does increase. Where should they be concentrated? A brief deepening of the analysis 
seems worthwhile to find a proper answer. 
 
 
3.2 Taxation by economic function and implicit rates 
 
The structure of taxation by economic function and according to implicit rates may give a 
clearer picture of the efficiency and equity effects of the tax burden, rather than the simple 
classification by institutional items we have up to now considered.  
                                                 
8 A similar suggestion might be found also in Burgess and Stern (1993) both for developing and transition 
countries. 
 13
 
i) Efficiency - According to a traditional rule, growth-enhancing taxes should be mainly 
imposed on consumption and rents, while leaving productive factors less hit. Table 3 shows 
that by economic function New Members’ consumption taxes stay on average around 13 per 
cent, within a max-min interval of about +/- 2 percentage points. Still according to economic 
function, EU 15 consumption taxes are somewhat lower than in New Members. The 
difference becomes smaller by considering implicit rates. Both these results are mainly due to 
the higher propensity to consume of New Members in comparison with that of EU. Employed 
labor is heavily hit in New Members, according both to the taxation structure by economic 
function, and to implicit rates. Average values of both figures do not vary much among 
countries and stay just very few points below EU ones. Finally, taxes on capital and business 
give a yield in GDP terms which is more than one third lower than the EU average. This wide 
gap is mainly due to the shadow economy’s wide evasion and to the generous exemptions 
allowed to financial capital incomes. To sum up, from the point of view of efficiency, New 
Members’ tax structure overburdens labor and hits in a very different degree the various 
components of capital and business (i.e. national accounting operating surplus). On the 
contrary, notice that consumption taxes stay at a comparatively high level. 
 
ii) Equity - Consumption taxes are traditionally considered as regressive. In New Members 
they may be particularly painful, because of the low level of per capita income, the wide share 
of unemployed and low pension’s drawers and as a consequence of the dismantling of 
consumption subsides. Taxes on labor are quite less heavy to be suffered. They are paid only 
by working people, and they largely finance welfare programs from which these people 
benefit. Thus the trade-off between efficiency and equity in taxation not just arises but 
appears particularly binding.  
 
 
3.3 Some more issues on the efficiency-equity trade-off 
 
In these circumstances, it is quite difficult to strike a welfare maximizing balance between 
efficiency and equity. Inequality in the distribution of incomes went up during the years of 
transition, thus redistributive policies are called for (Tanzi and Tsibouris 2000; see also 
Aghion and Commander 1999). Can tax system contribute to these policies, without 
damaging efficiency? A first step could be to reduce the high levels of social contributions,  
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 Tab. 3 Structure of taxation by economic function and implicit rates in New Members and EU 15 (late 1990s) 
                  
  Czech Estonia Hungary Poland Slovenia Average EU 15  
   Republic         New Members    
          
 Economic functions % GDP         
          
 Consumption 11.2 12.7 13.8 13.0 16.0 13.3 11.4  
 Labor Employed 18.5 19.8 19.9 14.0 20.1 18.5 21.2  
 Labor self-employed 2.9 1.3 1.2 5.1 - 2.6 2.3  
 Capital and business 5.7 0.3 5.0 4.2 4.4 3.9 7.5  
          
 Implicit tax rates         
          
 Consumption 15.6 15.5 18.9 16.3 21.0 17.5 16.8  
 Labor employed 38.6 39.4 41.9 37.2 38.4 39.1 41.9  
 Capital and business - - - - 21.5 - 31.1  
           
 Sources: EU Commission (2000) for selected New Members  and  Eurostat (2000) for EU 15 (1997 unweighted average).  
 Notes: Total taxation according to economic  function  is over Total fiscal revenue in Tab. 2, because of some double counting.  
               Implicit rates for capital and business are not available for all New membres, except Slovenia. 
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leaving room for an increase in personal income tax, also to partially finance social programs, 
as we have already suggested. 
Doing this step also by making income tax more progressive is a debated issue, and the 
solutions adopted by single New Members vary considerably, on economic, social and 
political grounds (see below, par. 4.1). One should also consider the need to make the tax as 
simple as possible, to avoid unaffordable difficulties of administrative enforcement (Tanzi 
1993; Bernardi and Majocchi 1994). Furthermore the redistributive effects of steeper 
graduated tax rates should not be over evaluated, just because incomes are highly 
concentrated around their (low) modal value. To sum up, a higher contribution of personal 
income tax to redistributive policies rests on two main conditions: a certain substitution of it 
for social contributions and the enlarging of its basis. The latter may be performed via the 
inclusion of incomes that at present are generally exempt or just slightly taxed (se below, par. 
4.19) and -even more- through the recovery of tax evasion, particularly from the wide sea of 
the hidden economy10. A more uniform treatment of different incomes will improve also 
efficiency (still below, par. 4.1). 
Efficiency requires the cutting down of social contributions. In principle, they should be 
replaced not only by giving a more important role to income (and wealth) taxation but also 
without lessen the present heavy consumption taxes. However this way would be somewhat 
extreme, because of the stringent equity argument already dealt with. The current satisfactory 
New Members’ rates of growth do not impose it. The resources’ basket (remind: tentatively 
about six-to-seven GDP points of income tax increase and expenditure cuts) might be equally 
divided between efficiency -lighter tax wedge on employed labor, via social contributions’ 
cut- and equity -income tax’ basis enlargement and consumption taxes’ squeezing.  
The mandatory harmonization of excises to EU standards was already planned to 
gradually take place during a transition period o0f up to ten years so to avoid the reduction of 
the living standards and the growth of illegal markets (see below, par. 4.3). VAT structure, as 
to exemptions and reduced (perhaps in few cases also negative) rates, should be well targeted 
also according to the empirical evidence of Engel’s curves. This is the only degree of freedom 
to lighten consumption taxation11. 
Efficiency’s targets require that, the mild taxation of corporations should be maintained, 
                                                 
9 Here we may anticipate that labor income generally is more heavily taxed (including social contributions) than 
saving vehicles. This is a specific case too of equity-efficiency trade off. 
10 This task should be accomplished through a large recourse to presumptive and minimum taxes (Tanzi 1994).  
11 Notice however that VAT outperforms PIT as “productive” efficiency in almost all New Members (see below, 
par. 4.3).  
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to favor the enlargement of entrepreneurship and to attract FDI (Easson 1998; Funke and 
Strulik 2003), also after the privatization decade and whatever may be the complaints of 
neighboring EU countries (Germany especially). Low general rates are also the best way to 
allow the dismantling of too favorable regimes for offshore firms, which are contrary to the 
EU code of conduct for business taxation. However corporation (or at least dividends) tax 
should not vanish, especially to impede the diffusion of avoidance activities (see below, par. 
4.2). 
We have already noticed (see also par. 4.4 below) that most New Members have already 
introduced or are planning to start reforms which are aimed at increasing the sustainability of 
welfare programs. We repeat now that many of these changes should be definitely applauded 
(e.g. the entitlements required for age pensions or the means test for other benefits); some of 
them are very questionable (e.g. the diffusion and itemizing of contributions to public social 
program funds), while on some others the jury is still out (the shift to mixed PAYG-funded 
systems for pensions). All in all, the more equity improving should be welfare programs that 
are effective in relieving the living conditions of the poor. From this point of view, a social 
safety net is the main step to do. 
 
 
 
4. A closer look to the most critical features of the main taxes 
 
 
4.1. The Personal Income Tax 
 
The standard prescription of orthodox economics is that the most efficient income tax is one 
that is uniform. The claim is that efficiency is highest when rates of taxation are the same 
across all types of income. This leads automatically to a further oft-quoted requirement that 
the tax base should be comprehensive, including all items that provide real income, since the 
tax cannot be uniform if some types of income are untaxed. However, in the vast majority of 
countries we observe that income tax is not as uniform as it could be, partly because the tax 
base is not comprehensive, but also for other reasons. We might have hoped that countries 
that largely created a tax system from scratch around 1990 would have had an opportunity to 
implement a uniform income tax. However, what we see in the New EU member states today 
is far from this, and it is thus pertinent to ask why. 
In order to consider this further it is necessary to review the assumptions on which the 
orthodox recommendation is based, especially given the normative nature of any discussion 
 17
of efficiency. Firstly it is based on a Paretian definition of efficiency, with no attempt to make 
social welfare trade-offs with non-Pareto optimal states. Secondly it is static, saying nothing 
about the impact of prior choices on economic decision-making. Thirdly, the prescription 
assumes that static economic (narrowly defined) efficiency is the primary goal of policy, 
disregarding social, political and other costs. A challenge to any of these three assumptions 
has the potential to provide a public interest explanation for departing from uniform taxation. 
However, we must also recognize that narrow interests have played a role in the formation 
of tax policy in the New EU member states. Following Olson (1965), the more narrowly a 
group can define itself the more success we would expect it to have in reducing its tax burden. 
Hence we might expect taxation of capital gains to be relatively less burdensome than 
taxation of a more wide-ranging category such as labor income. To some extent this type of 
phenomenon may form part of the political costs of forming winning coalitions behind 
legislative programs, but it may also result from more structural inefficiencies in the political 
process. We might test this prediction against the taxation of dividends. To take into 
consideration the double taxation of this form of income Table 4, below, lists the rates of 
corporate income tax and tax on dividends, calculates the combined rate and compares it with 
the general income tax rate. 
 
Tab. 4 Corporations, dividends and PIT rates in selected New Members 
 
 
Sources: Corresponding country chapters of this research; Ernst and Young and Centre for European Economic 
Research (ZEW) (2003), p. 11; Yakimova (2003), p. 101; Cok (2003); MSI (2004); 
<http://www.socmin.lt/?1845851012>; <http://www.cato.org/research/articles/tupy-040204.html>; KPMG 
(2003); owns calculations. 
Notes: a this rate only applies to dividends; b non-pension fund dividends; ; c26 per cent on profits repatriated 
abroad; d the lower rate applies to creative works. 
 
 
Country 
CIT 
Dividend Combined 
Tax on 
Income 
from 
Profit 
Ordinary 
income PIT 
Social security 
contributions 
Combined 
labor tax 
     Employer’s Employee’s  
Czech Republic 15.5a 25.0b 36.625 15.0-32.0 35.0 12.5 44.9-55.9 
Estonia 0.0c 26.0 26.0 26.0 33.5 1.0 45.1 
Hungary 16.0 20.0 32.8 18.0-38.0 29.0 11.5 43.7-57.5 
Latvia 15.0 0.0 15.0 25.0 24.1 9.0 45.0 
Lithuania 15.0 15.0 27.75 33.0(15.0)d 31.0 3.0 50.4(37.1)
Poland 27.0 15.0 37.95 19.0-40.0 18.4 18.7 44.4-58.8 
Slovakia 19.0 0.0 19.0 19.0 34.7-36.5 13.4 47.9-48.6 
Slovenia 25.0 30.0 47.5 17.0-50.0 16.1 22.1 44.3-66.5 
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The results are mixed. In five of the eight countries in this sample the combined dividend 
tax rate is lower than the top rate of income tax, and in only one case is it higher. Since we 
might expect shareholders to be in the top income tax bracket in most of these countries, that 
is a relevant comparison. However, it must also be noted that for individuals in the lowest 
income tax bracket, investing in shares, for example through their pension funds, implies 
higher tax rates than on ordinary income in five of the eight countries. This latter comparison 
has special relevance in Poland, since over 90 per cent of taxpayers there are in the lowest tax 
bracket. In Estonia and, from the beginning of 2004, Slovakia we observe the orthodox rule of 
equal tax rates across income types, achieved by not taxing profit at the corporate level in the 
former case and by non-taxation of dividends combined with equal corporate and personal 
income tax rates in the latter. 
This picture changes considerably when we take into consideration social security 
contributions. Adding the social security taxation to the calculation of tax paid on labor 
income implies that labor income is taxed more highly than dividends in all countries. Only 
within the lowest personal income tax bracket in Slovenia is labor income taxed more lightly 
than dividends. There are two caveats to this finding. Firstly, in many countries there is a cap 
on social security payments, hence the marginal rate of labor income taxation for top earners 
is only the top rate of personal income tax. Secondly, not all of the social security contribution 
is lost to the individual; some provides income in kind through increased unemployment, 
disability or pension insurance. This is in contrast to personal income tax payments, which 
provide no marginal benefits to the individual. However, it should be noted that in most of the 
New member states it is young people who have proved the most entrepreneurial, and these 
persons’ valuation of state social insurance is naturally low due to uncertainty over the future 
of the system. 
Another example of non-uniform income taxation is the non-taxation of interest income 
in Latvia. Combined with the non-taxation of dividends in this country and the deductions for 
expenditure on education and health there is an apparent distortion in favor of investment in 
financial and human capital and against consumption. A counter-argument to this is that, 
since investments come from funds that are already taxed as income once, taxation of such 
investments would be a distortion in favor of consumption and it is the Latvian structure that 
is neutral. Perhaps the strongest critique of this Paretian efficiency view is that it ignores 
equity. We may object on equity grounds to a system that does not tax high incomes gained 
from investments, especially since we know that many of the assets were accumulated illicitly 
during the chaotic early independence years. And the equity view is not entirely divorced 
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from efficiency; if we accept the diminishing marginal utility of income we might well expect 
that total social welfare would increase as we shift the tax burden from labor to investment 
income. Orthodox consideration of dynamics tends to assume that taxation of investment 
reduces economic growth to a sub-optimal level. However, to show this would require 
consideration of the size of positive externalities from one investment on returns or risk of 
another. 
There may also be inefficiencies in the EU New Members’ income taxation due to 
oversight, providing ready opportunities for reform. Such oversight can result from the weak 
public administration and government capacities in the former Soviet block countries. 
However, the rapid development of these economies likely contributes to the continuous 
creation of new areas for reform that are yet to be addressed, thus increasing the challenge for 
New member state governments. 
While the forgoing relates to the legal structure of taxation, the illegal evasion of tax has 
also had important consequences for universality in the new EU member states. By putting 
payment of taxes on an ad hoc basis, or worse making it dependent on manipulation of the 
bureaucracy, evasion reduces the efficiency of the tax system considerably. The existence of 
this type of distortion in the tax system also opens up the possibility of a trade-off between 
legal distortions and evasion. Hence, in Lithuania the income tax rate on creative work is 15 
per cent in contrast to the 33 per cent standard income tax rate. While this may be criticized 
for distorting the labor market in favor of non-standard labor contracts, it is clearly an attempt 
to take account of the relative ease with which individuals that create products independently 
can evade the income tax. 
Progressivity is an issue on which the New EU member states have found a surprising 
variety of solutions. While the orthodox Paretian efficiency position has demanded no 
progressivity, standard Western practice has implemented it on equity grounds and the 
“ability to pay” theory. We might also argue for it on the basis of the benefit principle if we 
accept that higher income individuals benefit more from the State than lower income 
individuals12. It should be noted that all current income tax systems are to some extent 
progressive since they all have personal exemptions. However, among the New EU member 
States the three Baltic States and Slovakia have all now rejected multiple tax rates and, 
combined with very low personal exemptions, this means that their average income tax rates 
hardly vary across the income range. While there has been some debate on the introduction of 
                                                 
12 This argument is based on the idea that it is the State that guarantees the institutions of private property that 
give rise to the current distribution of income 
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multiple tax rates, particularly in Lithuania, these have so far not been supported by any 
Baltic government. Indeed, the trend appears to be in the opposite direction, with Slovakia’s 
recent abandonment of multiple rates. 
Although the equity argument would appear critical in the Baltics at this time, there are a 
number of conditions of their transition that have perhaps contributed to the absence of 
multiple income tax rates there. Firstly, for young people especially, the Baltics might be seen 
as places where one’s income level is very hard to predict, with plenty of opportunities for 
increasing it rapidly. Hence, even those on low income may prefer the dream of low tax on 
high income in the future. This, however, implies a surprising love of risk given the 
uncertainty level. Perhaps a more plausible explanation of this idea is that voters are generally 
optimistic about their opportunities to move up the income scale, although this is not 
something that seems congruent with most public opinion survey results. An alternative is that 
there is a public interest in encouraging entrepreneurs to earn high income by generating 
economic activity, thus creating a dynamic positive externality for all. This may be 
particularly acute in the relatively low income Baltic States. Also, it may be an attempt to 
limit tax evasion, in recognition of the greater ease with which high income earners would 
evade, or even, avoid tax. This may be accentuated partly by the small size of the Baltic 
States, and also by their relative lack of capacity in tax collection, being the only New EU 
Members to have emerged from the U.S.S.R. itself. Lastly we should not ignore the influence 
of the special interest of high-income individuals. These form small enough groups in the 
Baltic States to be able to effectively lobby governments against any increases in their tax 
rates. 
In contrast the country with the most progressive income tax rates, and the largest range 
in its tax rates on non-exempt income, is Slovenia. This is also a small country, within the size 
range of the Baltic States; hence size does not appear to have been a crucial factor easing tax 
evasion and avoidance here. This suggests that neighbors may also be important here; 
Slovenia neighbors relatively high tax States such as Croatia and Italy, whereas the Baltic 
states neighbor Russia with its flat 13per cent income tax rate. However, we might also expect 
the arguments about the Baltics to apply in reverse to Slovenia. Slovenia has, perhaps, a more 
stable social structure than the Baltics, Slovenians may be more realistic about their chances 
to change their position in society, Slovenians may expect less positive externalities from 
entrepreneurs (possibly due to greater integration with other EU States), and may have more 
confidence in the tax authority’s ability to impose high tax rates on them. Lastly there may be 
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a more disperse group of high income earners in Slovenia and political institutions may be 
more adept at resisting interest group pressure. 
 
 
4.2. The Corporate Income Tax 
 
It is well known that the role of the corporate income tax, or profit tax, in the tax system has 
been controversial at least since the development of Musgravian public finance and this 
controversy has been played out graphically in the New EU member States. We may just 
recall that orthodox public finance theory criticizes the profit tax as a cause of the double 
taxation of dividends. This, it is often argued, compounds the injustice of taxing investment 
from income that has already been taxed resulting in a triple taxation of such funds, before 
they are even spent. Furthermore, economists argue that the fiction of taxation of a “legal 
person” only serves to hide the true burden of the tax on real persons. As we have already 
seen, Latvia and Slovakia have prevented the double taxation of dividends by making 
dividends tax exempt. Estonia took another course, abolishing the corporate income tax from 
the beginning of 2000 and taxing only profits distributed abroad, while leaving domestic 
dividends taxed at the same rate as ordinary income. This has, however, brought Estonia into 
conflict with the European Commission, since it implies prejudicial tax treatment of dividends 
paid to non-Estonian versus Estonian corporate shareholders. 
Arguments in favor of taxation of corporations can be divided into the income 
measurement dilemma and the practical. The income measurement dilemma is that the 
retained profits of a corporation may give real benefit to its owners even if never distributed 
and the shares are never sold. Shareholders gain financial security and economic and social 
power through the increased strength of their company. Hence the only way to tax this real 
benefit would be at the corporate level. The practical argument is that, even in advanced EU 
Members, Finance Ministries believe that without the corporate income tax the scope for 
avoidance and evasion of the personal income tax and social security payments would be 
significantly higher since the incentive for corporations to show employment expenses would 
vanish. With corporations no longer required to declare their expenditures, evasion would 
become significantly tougher for the authorities to prevent possibly leading to a weakening of 
the personal income tax and social security system. In particular, if persons who incorporated 
themselves (e.g. doctors and lawyers) would face no profit tax they would find it much easier 
to hide personal income from the tax authorities. Hence we observe continued corporate 
income tax rates of up to 31 per cent in the Czech Republic. Note that even at that rate the 
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incentive to hide employment expenditure still exists; it is more financially advantageous to 
pay 31 per cent on retained earnings than even the lowest 15 per cent income tax rate on 
wages due to the 35 per cent social security tax on wage income in that country. This pattern 
is repeated everywhere so profit tax is only a partial offset to the cost of honestly declaring 
wages. 
While the income measurement dilemma is of a more normative nature it is potentially 
useful to ask whether the Estonian experiment in eliminating the corporate income tax for 
domestic investors has led to the damage to personal income tax collections predicted by the 
practical argument. While recent data on personal income tax revenue are not readily 
available for Estonia, the overall level appears to have held steady at about eight and a half 
percent of GDP from 1999 to 2002, despite a dip of about a percentage in the initial two years 
of reform13.  
We know that there is a third, more fundamental, argument in favor of taxes on profit, 
however. A truly uniform tax system must not discriminate against labor income. However, 
labor income can also be interpreted as a return on investment in human capital. Much of that 
investment may not be financial but an investment of effort, for example while undergoing 
schooling. Hence to completely remove taxation of income from financial investments while 
retaining it on investments in human capital would create a bias. It would mean that persons 
would have an artificial incentive to pay more attention to studying the stock market than to 
studying more traditional subjects that create real productivity. From a truly orthodox 
economic perspective there is no reason to tax returns on an investment of saved financial 
resources any differently from an equivalent return on an investment of leisure time. 
The foregoing looks only at static welfare considerations, however. States have often felt 
that there are dynamic benefits from encouraging economic agents to shift to profit seeking 
activities rather than labor. An individual is likely to be more dynamic and flexible when 
involved directly in profit seeking activities than when working for labor income. This may 
spill over to faster growth in GDP for the State as a whole. In addition, since individuals are 
risk averse, while the State can afford to be risk neutral with regard to a particular investment, 
there may be good reasons to expect under-investment in more risky activities by individuals. 
The State can reduce taxation of profit to increase efficiency in both cases. How much 
optimal profit tax would then differ from tax on labor income would then vary from country 
to country depending on the types of profit seeking activities likely to be encouraged, the 
                                                 
13 These comparisons are based on the top rates of labor income taxation. 
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varieties of labor likely to be discouraged and their relative dynamism in the economy in 
question. Generally we might expect that the optimal differentiation between labor income tax 
and profit tax would be negatively correlated with the flexibility of the labor market and 
institutional hindrances to business in the economy. However, flexibility of the labor market 
also improves the business conditions for entrepreneurs and thus the overall effect of this 
factor might be relatively weak. 
Comparing the ratio of disposable income from profit and from wages across the New 
member States we find labor taxed relatively the most in Poland, Latvia and Hungary14. If we 
 
Tab. 5 Disposable income of shareholders vs. wage earners from equal total factor earnings 
 
Country Without social security With social security 
Czech Republic 0.75-0.93 1.15-1.44 
Estonia 1.00 1.35 
Hungary 0.82-1.10 1.19-1.58 
Latvia 1.13 1.54 
Lithuania 1.07(0.85) 1.46(1.15) 
Poland 0.85-1.15 1.24-1.67 
Slovakia 1.00 1.55-1.58 
Slovenia 0.63-1.05 0.94-1.57 
 
  Source: See source for Tale 4. Own calculations. 
 
include social contributions and look at the ratios of disposable income the greatest 
disincentive to sell labor is in Poland, Slovakia and Hungary (see Table 5). The countries with 
the most even-handed treatment of dividends and labor income are the Czech Republic and 
Estonia. We may compare this data with the data from the Heritage Foundation on which 
countries have the greatest economic freedom, and thus the best conditions for entrepreneurial 
dynamism15. The Heritage Foundation data shows starkly that Estonia is much more 
economically free than the other New member States. Hence it is surprising that Estonia is 
one of the countries with the least tax incentive to switch from labor to profit seeking. This 
appearance may be illusory, however, since in Estonia investors may defer taxation by 
retaining earnings within the company, providing a greater tax bias against labor than is 
apparent from the tax rates alone. Conversely Slovenia and Poland are estimated to be the 
countries with the least favorable business conditions. Hence it is surprising to see that Poland 
has the largest tax incentive to switch towards entrepreneurship. Slovenia has a middle-sized 
tax incentive against labor, again contradicting the expectation that such incentives are less 
                                                 
14 These comparisons are based on the top rates of labor income taxation. 
15 Miles, Fuelner and O’Grady (2004). 
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useful in countries with less supportive business environments. Overall, then, the pattern is 
mixed with good reason to suppose that business lobbying that is not in step with the public 
interest drives some countries’ reductions in profit tax. 
There is also a question of international competition to lower corporate taxation. Some 
countries may be tempted to attract foreign investment by imposing a relatively low rate of 
tax on profit16. It is often argued that foreign direct investment has positive dynamic 
externalities for the economy by accelerating introduction of more efficient management. 
Profits repatriated by foreign investors in Estonia are subject to a 26 per cent tax, thus this 
small Baltic State cannot be accused of using the repeal of the profit tax to compete 
aggressively for foreign investment. This criticism could more logically be aimed at Latvia, 
Lithuania and Hungary, all of which have taxed profits at less than 20 per cent for some time. 
There is some evidence that these low tax rates are having knock-on effects throughout the 
region. In 2004 there have been dramatic reductions in the profit tax rates in Poland and 
Slovakia, combined with a further easing in Latvia and Hungary. Whether these rates are 
moving below what would be optimal is difficult to say definitively, given the previous 
arguments justifying the presence itself of a corporate tax. The most extreme case is Poland, 
where profit seekers keep a 67 per cent larger proportion of their earnings than kept by top 
income tax bracket individuals dependent on wages. 
 
 
4.3. The Value Added Tax and Excises 
 
It is worthwhile to recall that value added taxes, like the income taxes, were originally seen as 
a way to tax total GDP. Rather than tracing income, VAT uses the value added at each stage 
of production as the tax basis. Hence it is revealing to compare the success of the VAT in 
raising revenue with that of the income tax. This comparison is less precise in countries with 
multiple income tax rates. Moreover, the exemptions and deductions of the income tax and 
the exemptions of the VAT mean that the tax bases are not the same. However, from the 
orthodox economic perspective, all these differences are sources of inefficiency and not 
necessarily less pernicious than evasion of taxes. Hence it is still of interest to compare the 
efficacy of these two taxes in terms of revenue raised. Table 6 makes this comparison. To take 
the example of Lithuania, in 2000 its personal income tax and VAT each raised 7.6 per cent 
of GDP despite the fact that the basic income tax rate was 33 per cent while the VAT rate was 
only 18 per cent. Hence, the average efficacy of a percentage of VAT was almost double that 
                                                 
16 This issue is discussed at length inside an other part of the whole research. 
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of a percentage of income tax. Any deviation of either of those taxes from a comprehensive 
tax on GDP is a source of inefficiency according to economic theory, whether that deviation 
results from legal or illegal activity. So this very raw number provides a strong argument in 
favor of shifting the balance of taxation from the personal income tax towards the value added 
tax in that country. In Hungary, by contrast, a significantly higher rate of VAT did not result 
in proportionately higher revenue and hence was not as demonstrably more efficacious than 
its multiple-rate personal income tax. 
 
Tab. 6 Rates of PIT and VAT compared with their revenue as per cent of GDP in 2000 
Country PIT rates PIT 
revenue 
PIT 
efficacy 
VAT 
rate 
VAT 
revenue 
VAT 
efficacy 
VAT/PIT 
efficacy 
ratio 
Czech Republica 10.0-40.0 5.2 0.13-0.52 22.0 7.6 0.35 0.6-2.7 
Latvia 25.0 6.0 0.24 18.0 7.8 0.43 1.8 
Estonia 26.0 7.7 0.30 18.0 9.5 0.53 1.8 
Hungarya 20.0-40.0 7.0 0.18-0.35 25.0 8.6 0.34 1.0-1.9 
Lithuania 33.0 (15.0) 7.6 0.23(0.51) 18.0 7.6 0.42 1.8(0.8) 
Polanda 21.0-40.0 5.5 0.14-0.26 22.0 8.0 0.36 1.4-2.6 
Slovakiaa 17.0-42.0 5.2 0.12-0.31 23.0 7.6 0.33 1.1-2.8 
Sloveniaa 17.0-50.0 6.4 0.13-0.38 20.0 15.4 0.77 2.0-5.9 
a1999-2000 average. Sources: Yakimova (2002); Mitra and Stern (2003); country chapters of this research. 
 
Perhaps a more robust comparison is to compare the success of VAT across countries. 
Here we see that the VAT efficacy, which is equivalent to the ratio of the VAT tax base to 
GDP, ranged from 33 per cent in Slovakia to 77 per cent in Slovenia. Slovenia stands out as a 
success story here, and underlines the room for other New member States to improve. But it is 
interesting to note that the other more advanced countries in the group, the Visegrad 
countries, do not do well and are superseded by the Baltic States. Hence we may ask why 
does Estonia do so well at collecting VAT and why does Hungary do so badly? One drawback 
of this simple approach is that it ignores the underestimation of GDP that results from tax 
evasion. Hence the Baltic States may appear to have higher VAT efficacy than the Visegrad 
countries only because the latter have done a better job at measuring GDP. 
Excise taxation is an area of some controversy as the New member states integrate into 
the European Union. During the accession negotiations the European Commission felt that the 
low excise duties in many accession states threatened the taxes of existing member States and 
demanded increases. This was clearly going to be politically unpopular in the accession 
States. Their governments’ dilemma was increased by the fact that excise taxes had proved to 
be the most easily evaded and hardest to implement. In countries that border Belarus or the 
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countries of former Yugoslavia the opportunity for smuggling cigarettes, alcohol and petrol 
was high. Hence New member States negotiated transition periods of up to 10 years, during 
which they would gradually increase excise duties to EU norms, while trying to clamp down 
on smuggling and evasion. Such excises can increase the efficiency of the taxation system by 
taxing goods with relatively low price elasticities of demand and negative externalities. 
However, a jump up in taxation that leads to expansion of evasion will only serve to weaken 
the taxation system, along with other social institutions. 
 
 
4.4. Social security contributions 
 
As is well known, governments have long decided that some benefits should be allocated to 
individuals based on their tax history. Certain benefits would be conditional on the individual 
having paid taxes over a minimum period, others would also vary according to the amount of 
taxes paid. Governments started using this approach with regard to pension benefits, and have 
gradually extended it to other areas. Hence government provided a type of collective 
insurance of individuals against the “risk” of reaching old age and viewed this differently to 
other benefits. There was a distinction between welfare “Beveridgean” payments to ensure the 
elderly a minimum standard of living and “Bismarkian”pension benefits based on how much 
an individual had paid in during their working years. Hence taxes paid for social security 
became viewed differently to other taxes that had no effect on the individual’s eligibility for 
benefits. 
This system raises a number of interesting questions that it is worthwhile to recall here, 
because they have been answered in different ways by the New member states. The first 
question might be what is the government role in providing these benefits? If individual 
benefits depend on individual premiums why can’t the private insurance market efficiently 
serve this demand? One answer to this for risk-averse individuals is that collective provision 
allows for more comprehensive risk pooling. Private insurance will seek to discriminate 
among individuals based on their riskiness, and individuals themselves will self-select 
insurance pools based on their knowledge of their own riskiness. To avoid the uncertainty 
generated by lack of knowledge of their future risk level individuals rationally decide to 
organize the insurance collectively without heed to individual characteristics that affect risk. 
The collective has no incentive to discriminate, which private insurance companies would 
have even if they were legally forbidden from doing so. Another argument in favor of 
collective provision of pensions is that it gives a benefit to middle class voters, hence 
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strengthening support for collective benefits that would otherwise go only to the poor. This 
may increase social welfare due to the diminishing marginal utility of income. 
While the foregoing arguments seem to continue to garner support as a basis for social 
security systems there is a third that appears less widely respected, particularly in several of 
the New member states. Individuals saving for their retirement are initially considering 
investments of 30 years or longer. This is a long enough period to see through several cycles 
of financial markets but not necessarily all. In the financial history of the twentieth century 
there have been 30-year periods during which stock market indices were lower at the end than 
at the beginning. Individual investors face even more risk in practice since their investment 
portfolios are unlikely to mirror stock market indices precisely. Hence, even over these 
relatively long periods, considerable financial risk remains for an individual. Collective 
provision of social security is a way to remove this risk. 
However, in a number of New member states the financial risk has been returned to the 
individual through implementation of the “three pillar” pension system. This leaves in place a 
reduced basic pension based on pay as you go contributions of current workers, but diverts 
some social security taxes to investment in individual accounts with returns dependent on the 
success of the fund the taxpayer decides to invest in. The third pillar then consists of 
favorable tax treatment of any additional non-mandatory investments the individual makes to 
these funds. The states that have implemented the three-pillar pension system include 
Hungary, Poland and the Baltic states (Lithuania significantly later and more cautiously than 
the other two), and most recently, Slovakia. Interestingly the Czech Republic and Slovenia 
have resisted such moves, perhaps demonstrating the greater credulity of the populations of 
these more capitalism savvy nations to the vagaries of financial markets. 
Another element of the experience of several New EU member states has been the 
expansion of the public insurance principle to other benefits. It is perhaps natural that 
workers’ accident compensation is related to their income at work and a similar case can be 
made for maternity leave and disability benefits. The level of social contributions tax rates 
depends on the generosity of the benefits relative to average wages and the dependency ratio 
of benefit recipients to taxpayers. It ranges from 26 per cent of the total cost of employment in 
Latvia to 38 per cent in Hungary. The high rate of social security tax in Hungary is partly 
governed by its low labor force participation rate, less than 60 per cent until 2000 compared 
to over three quarters in Latvia. Social contributions are a larger proportion of the total cost of 
employment than the personal income tax in all New member states, e.g. 38 per cent versus a 
maximum of 24 per cent, respectively, in Hungary. Thus it is often social contributions that 
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are primarily blamed for creating incentives for businesses to hide wage payments. 
Continuing the Hungarian example, it is preferable to pay 16 per cent profit tax on a sum than 
show it as expenditure on employment and pay a minimum of 50 per cent of it in tax, 
consisting of 38 per cent social contributions and a minimum of 12 per cent personal income 
tax. 
As mentioned above many analysts have traditionally not considered social contributions 
as taxes because they provide a direct benefit to the individual payer. However, we must 
recognize that social contributions are still involuntary levies collected by the state, and that 
many of their benefits may not be of practical use. In traditional pay-as-you-go pension 
systems the contributions of workers made no difference to their benefits at the margin unless 
they were in their last ten years of employment. In the three pillar systems that have swept the 
region many contributors might well heavily discount their expected returns based on the 
greater financial risk. Higher income individuals, especially, are likely to find state pension 
schemes, particularly in the relatively poor New member states, inadequate and prefer private 
insurance for disability, unemployment and pensions. All individuals in these relatively 
unstable societies are likely to assign low probabilities to welfare benefits being available for 
them when needed. Hence for a successful entrepreneur in the New member states, who is 
likely to be young and have high income, social contributions payments may represent a true 
tax in the sense that they provide little expected benefit. 
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